speculative theology had earned him the title of a 'Prussian Hume'. 5 And nearly two hundred years later, it was Hamann's comment that inspired Lewis White Beck to argue that Hume might well be thought of as a 'Scottish Kant'. 6 More recently, Manfred Kuehn, Gary Hatfield, and Eric
Watkins have each expanded on Hamann's suggestion, arguing that Kant viewed Hume's philosophy as a forerunner to his own critique of metaphysics. 7 But the most forceful, detailed, and radical defense of this second story is the one given transcendental idealism and a synthetic a priori account of causal and mathematical judgments. 9 Thus, on Waxman's view, it is Kant's incorporation of the a priori intuitions of space and time that has created the illusion of radical discontinuity between Kant and Hume where there is in fact great and hitherto unnoticed continuity. 10 Waxman's justification of this new and provocative account of Kant's relationship to Hume relies crucially on claims about Hume's influence on Kant and, conversely, Kant's debt to Hume. 11 In particular, Waxman thinks that Kant quite consciously adopted two doctrines from
Hume that, when combined with his account of a priori intuition, allowed him to undermine rationalist claims to cognition of supersensible objects while at the same time providing a Humean solution to the problem of necessary connection between distinct existences that
Waxman believes lies at the heart of Hume's views on causation. 12 Waxman calls these two doctrines sensibilism and psychologism. I will return to them shortly.
To be sure, Kant's affinities with Hume have been neglected. But I believe Waxman's reading of them should be resisted. After elaborating on Waxman's conception of sensibilism and psychologism and developing criticisms of his claim that each is an instance of Kant's debt to Hume in section one, I introduce my own, more modest proposal about Kant's debt to Hume in section two and discuss the limits of Kant's debt in section three. As I hope to show in these last two sections, Kant credited Hume with being the first to argue that an analysis of the mind and the sources of its representations can yield strong arguments against rationalist claims to cognition of supersensible objects and regarded this analysis as an important (albeit a fundamentally flawed) forerunner of his arguments in the Critique. In discussing the extent to which I believe it is and is not appropriate to regard Kant as a 'Prussian Hume', I also hope to provide at least a partial explanation for the consistent appeal of the two very different stories I have just sketched.
SENSIBILISM AND PSYCHOLOGISM: WAXMAN ON KANT'S DEBT TO HUME
Sensibilism, according to Waxman's initial formulation, is the thesis that all mental representations (perceptions in Hume's case) 'originate in (are coeval with) being perceived, and have no existence prior to or independently of their immediate presence to consciousness in perception'. 13 But while this formulation may suggest that sensibilism is merely a thesis about the origin and existence of mental representations as such, Waxman makes clear that it is alsoperhaps even fundamentally-a thesis about the content of these representations. 14 Sensibilism is thus the view (a) that what all representations are representations of is either the objects of immediate perception or the products of the mind's operations on those objects and (b) that neither these representations nor their contents have any existence 'prior to or independently of' their immediate presence to the conscious mind.
Further, Waxman emphasizes that the perception in which the sensibilist believes all mental representations and their contents originate and on which their existence depends is not limited to sensations (visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, or gustatory) but includes the mind's perception of its own representational activity. Following a suggestion by Locke, Waxman calls this latter perception internal sense. 15 And it is the inclusion of the objects of internal sense among the contents of sense that allows the sensibilist to account for our possession of concepts that the content of a particular representation is due to the mind's operations on the data of sense, psychologism endorses limiting the use of that representation 'to the purview of the experiencing mind' in the same sense that, e.g. our representation of 'pleasures and pains', as subjective contents, are so limited. 21 The psychologizer is thus committed to a substantive view about the proper use of mental representations whose content is the result of the operations of the mind on the objects of internal sense described in the previous paragraph. In particular, she is committed to the view that a representation cannot be legitimately used to refer to anything mindindependent if the operations of the mind have made any contribution (however minimal) to its content. Call such representations psychologically tainted. Armed with this neologism, we can elaborate on the commitments of psychologism as follows. Psychologism holds that the use of psychologically tainted representations to represent objective states of affairs in the world is illegitimate for the same reason that we all naturally believe it is illegitimate to use any essentially subjective concept, such as pain or joy, in contexts that abstract from its subjective content. Both involve the application of a representation whose content is essentially minddependent to something that is essentially mind-independent. Thus, if Hume is correct that the content of our concept of necessary connection is nothing more than the 'customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant', the psychologistic conclusion is that any application of this concept to mind-independent objects or states of affairs (such as the impact of two billiard balls) is just as illegitimate as claims about 'unfelt pain, joy, or hate'. the objects immediately present in sense and the mental operations performed on these objects.
For Hume, at least in the Enquiry, an example of the former would be the impression of one billiard ball colliding with another, while an example of the latter would be the impression of the 'customary transition' of the imagination from the idea of the first billiard to the idea of the second involved in our judgment that the impact of the first is the cause of the motion of the second.
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So the Kantian correlates of these data should be of two types: (a) something immediately present in sense and (b) mental operations on whatever the first kind of thing turns out to be. Further, if Kant is to be a sensibilist, what it is that we are aware of in inner sense would also include the operations of the mind on these data.
Since the introduction of pure sensible intuition is what Waxman regards as the novel element of Kant's alleged sensibilism, one possible interpretation is that the 'data of sense' are particular sensible intuitions as well as the operations of the understanding on those intuitions.
But if this is the case, then neither type of datum is one of which we are aware at all in inner sense, much less one that serves as the raw material for mental operations of which we are aware. For both particular sensible intuitions and the operations of the understanding on them are what give rise to Kantian inner sense in the first place. As a result, the only sense in which they can be said to be 'among the objects of inner sense' for Kant is incompatible with the sensibilist thesis that these data, like all representations, are immediately available to consciousness. In other words, if we interpret internal sense as Kantian inner sense, a sensibilist reading of Kant commits him to the view that we are aware of particular sensible intuitions prior to their synthesis in the understanding and the operations of the mind that constitute that synthesis. The former is incompatible with Kant's insistence that there can be no cognition without the synthesizing activity of the understanding. 30 And the latter is incompatible with this view that this activity is not available to us through inner sense but is instead the action of the cognitively inaccessible noumenal self.
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Of course, it is a conclusion of Kant's theory of cognition that the objects of inner sense are the products of the synthesizing activity of the understanding and thus that they are 'tainted' by those operations. And one might object that it is precisely in this sense that those operations should be regarded as 'among the objects of inner sense' on a psychologist reading of Kant. But knowing that they are tainted and being conscious of the operations by which they are tainted are two different things. And while knowledge of the former is consistent with Kant's theory of cognition, it is not sufficient to qualify that theory as sensibilist without vitiating the continuity Waxman identifies between Kant and Hume. For it is a characteristic feature of Hume's theory of cognition (and of Locke's) that it is possible for us to be aware of the operations of the mind on the data of sense as such and not merely that some or all the objects of inner sense are products of them. Otherwise, the strategy Hume pursues of tracing our idea of necessary connection back to the impression of 'customary transition' in the imagination would not be open to him. Thus, the cost of accepting knowledge that objects of inner sense are the product of operations of the mind as knowledge of those operations in a reading of Kant is that those operations cannot be 'among' the objects of inner sense for Kant in the same way that they are for Hume.
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Since psychologism presupposes sensibilism, any reason to resist the claim that Kant is committed to sensibilism is a fortiori a reason to resist the claim that he is committed to psychologism. But there are independent reasons for resisting this narrower claim as well. In particular, psychologism is too coarse-grained to capture Kant's distinction between thinking and cognizing. In order to cognize an object for Kant, it is necessary that the object conform to the conditions of possible experience. That is, it must be an object in space and time subject to the categories. Merely to think an object, in contrast, requires only that the object not violate the law of non-contradiction, that is, that the predicates that jointly define it not contain a contradiction.
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However, both thinking and cognition involve the use of the categories. And it is with respect to this point that Waxman's psychologism seems a poor fit for Kant. It is crucial to both Kant's practical philosophy and his account of the regulative use of reason that human freedom, God, and the soul can all be objects of thought and, hence, that the categories used in thoughts about these objects have a legitimate transcendent use, albeit one that does not amount to cognition.
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But Waxman suggests in a number of places that, according to psychologism, the use of psychologically tainted representations like the categories to describe mind-independent objects is not only illegitimate but absurd. As a result, psychologism appears unable to accommodate a distinction that is central to many of Kant's aims in the Critique. foremost, an attempt to undermine rationalist claims to cognition of supersensible objects. 42 That is, although Hume's specific targets were certainly different from Kant's, Kant believes that Hume's primary aim was, like his own, to undermine the possibility of transcendent metaphysics. 43 Characterizations of Hume's aims in these terms are found in passages from the first Critique, Prolegomena, and second Critique, which I now discuss in turn.
Kant's most extensive discussion of Hume in the first Critique is in the 'Discipline of Pure
Reason', the first and longest part of the 'Doctrine of Method'. The Discipline contains Kant's final word on his critique of Wolffian special metaphysics (the sub-discipline of Wolffian philosophy concerned with the existence and nature of God, the soul, and the world in its totality). So it is natural that he also use this part of the Critique to reflect on the advantages his critique has over similar efforts to expose the futility of rationalist attempts to cognize supersensible objects. For this reason, it is significant that the approach he chooses to contrast with his own is Hume's (A764/B792). Elaborating on the specific problems Kant identifies would take us too far afield. 44 But his general conclusion is that Hume's response to rationalism is inferior to his own because Hume does not provide an effective means to counteract reason's natural tendency to overstep its proper bounds. 45 Kant claims that reason is 'annoyed here and there' by Hume's arguments but that its 'entirely peculiar momentum is not in the least disturbed, but only hindered' by them (A768/B796). 46 Put in less Kantian terms, Kant's claim is that Hume's arguments are effective against some arguments that purport to establish cognition of supersensible objects like God and the soul but that they lack the comprehensiveness needed to undermine all such arguments. Such comprehensiveness, he believes, can only be found in a critique of our cognitive faculties and, in particular, in a critique of reason. In the first Critique, then, Kant describes Hume's project as one whose aim is essentially the same as his own.
Similar descriptions can be found in the second Critique and Prolegomena. In the former, Kant again describes Hume's project as the attempt to undermine claims to cognition of supersensible objects. After criticizing Feder's attempt in Über Raum und Causalität to show that 'there is and can be no a priori cognition at all', Kant comments that Hume would have been completely satisfied with this 'empiricism in principles' because he:
asked nothing more than that a merely subjective meaning of necessity, namely custom, be assumed in place of any objective meaning of necessity in the concept of cause, so as to deny reason any judgment about God, freedom, and immortality. (5:12-3) 47 Two things are significant about this passage. The first is that Kant lists at least two and, arguably, three of the objects of special metaphysics as ones that Hume intends to show we cannot cognize. 48 The second is that Kant characterizes Hume's desire to show that cognition of these supersensible objects is impossible as the motivation for his account of causation. Kant his denial of our ability to cognize supersensible objects. And Kant is careful to emphasize that the question motivating this analysis is whether the concept of cause 'is thought through reason a priori, and in this way has an inner truth independent of all experience, and therefore also a much more widely extended use which is not limited merely to objects of experience' (4:259).
57
As Kant understands Hume, then, his main concern is to determine whether the concept of cause has a legitimate supersensible use, and he believes that the proper way to do this is to determine whether it is generated by reason. 58 Kant attributes the same strategy to Hume in both editions of the first Critique. Before discussing his reasons for believing that Hume's attempt to undermine rationalist claims to cognition of supersensible objects lacks the comprehensiveness of his own, Kant gives a brief description of Hume's arguments:
He [i.e. Hume] dwelt primarily on the principle of causality, and quite rightly remarked about that that one could not base its truth (indeed not even the objective validity of the concept of an efficient cause in general) on any insight at all, i.e. a priori cognition, and thus that the authority of this law is not constituted in the least by its necessity, but only by its merely general usefulness in the course of experience and a subjective necessity arising therefrom, which he called custom. Now from the incapacity of reason in general to make use of this principle that goes beyond all experience, he inferred the nullity of all pretensions of reason in general to go beyond the empirical. (A760/B789) all arguments purporting to demonstrate the materiality of the soul (materialism), the nonexistence of God (atheism), the unrestricted application of the causal law (fatalism), and
God's coextension with the physical world (pantheism) in order to eliminate any possible threats to the practical arguments he offers for God's existence, human freedom, and the immortality of the soul. 60 But it should also provide a convincing account of the substantive a priori claims we are entitled make on purely theoretical grounds.
Attending to these nuances of Kant Hume perhaps had it in mind, although he never fully developed it, that in judgments of a certain kind we go beyond our concept of the object. I have called this sort of judgment synthetic. There is no difficulty about how, by means of experience, I can go beyond the concepts that I possess thus far […] But we also believe ourselves to be able to go beyond our concept a priori and to amplify our cognition. We attempt to do this either through pure understanding, with regard to that which can at least be an object of experience, or even through pure reason, with regard to such properties of things, or even with regard to the existence of such objects, that can never come forth in experience.
(A764-5/B792-3)
Kant then proceeds to contrast his own view with Hume's and to emphasize that, in contrast to the important but limited extent to which he believes we are able to amplify our concepts a priori, Hume denies synthetic a priori cognition tout court:
Our skeptic [i.e. Hume] did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as he should have, and for that reason held this augmentation of concepts out of themselves and the parthenogenesis, so to speak, of our understanding (together with reason), without impregnation by experience, to be impossible; thus he held all of its supposedly a priori principles to be merely imagined, and found that they are nothing but a custom arising from experience and its laws, thus are merely empirical, i.e., intrinsically contingent rules, to which we ascribe a supposed necessity and universality. (A765/B793)
The suggestion that Hume denies synthetic a priori cognition because he does not distinguish between judgments of reason and judgments of the understanding is intriguing. It suggests that this distinction lies at the heart of Kant's own understanding of the fundamental differences between himself and Hume. But the relevant point for our purposes is Kant's comment that Hume regards the a priori 'augmentation of concepts […] to be impossible', since it is this augmentation that distinguishes synthetic a priori judgments from analytic ones. Waxman is to neglect the way in which the arguments of the Critique ultimately serve the ends of his moral philosophy. As we have seen, this is one of the respects in which, despite all of his praise, Kant explicitly distinguishes himself from Hume. Moreover, we have also seen that the cost of reading Kant as a sensibilist is to overlook one of the most profound differences between his account of cognition and those of his empiricist predecessors: the conviction that inner sense is something whose distinctive features are the products of operations of the mind that are ultimately inaccessible to us. For these reasons, I believe that Kant's debt to Hume is limited to the relatively modest influence I have described in section two. Hume was the first to use an analysis of the mind and the sources of its representations to provide strong arguments against our ability to cognize supersensible objects. And while Kant ultimately rejected these arguments for the reasons I have noted, he still believed it appropriate to credit Hume with having 'struck a spark' in the field of metaphysics and with having helped him develop his own ideas in the 'Third, and most important, the British Empiricists and Kant counted the mind's perceptions of the operations it performs on the data of sense (reflexions as well as sensations) among the objects of inner sense: perceiving, reproducing, previous perceptions, remembering; discerning, comparing, separating, combining; considering as one, considering as related without uniting; forming propositions (judgment), forming sequences of propositions (reasoning); willing, assenting, doubting; and so forth'. 29 Hume, Enquiries, p. 75. Hume's account of our perception of objects, as opposed to mere collections of simple ideas, is more complicated in the Treatise. But in the Enquiry, he speaks freely of objects and seems to grant, at least for the purposes of articulating his account of causal judgment, that we have impressions of objects. See, for example, the pivotal final three paragraphs of Section VII. 30 See A50-1/B74-5. 31 Kant does appear to believe that we are conscious of our noumenal selves, but he is clear that this is only a consciousness that we are. More importantly, he explicitly rejects the idea that we are conscious of ourselves as we are, which it seems would be required for the operations of the mind that give rise to inner sense to be among its objects as well (B157 32 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer from the journal for comments prompting me to clarify the ideas in this paragraph. 33 Kant first introduces this distinction in the B-Preface, where he elaborates on it in the following way: 'To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori through reason). But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e. as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities' (Bxxvi). 34 See Bxxvii-xxx, A532-58/B560-86, A640-2/B668-70, A669-704 /B697-732, and A795-819/B823-47. stating that 'a detailed response to this objection will have to await volume II' of his book, which has yet to appear, he suggests that Kant's description of the categories at B128-9 allows for the possibility that they might be given 'transcendental content' in a way other than the way in which this is done in the Metaphysical Deduction and that this possibility is sufficient to render the concept of noumenal freedom consistent with Kant's alleged commitment to psychologism. Without wanting to pass judgment on arguments Waxman has yet to give, I have two reservations about this strategy as he develops it in the footnote. First, even if it is successful in the case of noumenal freedom and can be generalized to our idea of God, it is not clear how this strategy could be used to account for our regulative use of the transcendental ideas since the alternate way of giving transcendental content to the categories Waxman discusses is only supposed to give them a 'strictly practical' meaning. Second, I do not see how it could be generalized to our idea of God without violating the central tenet of psychologism, since even a concept of God with purely practical content would involve the application of the categories to something independent of our own minds.
And however this is done, such an application of the categories for the psychologizer must be as absurd as claims about unfelt pains and joys. While the strategy Waxman outlines may allow him to show that some of Kant's uses of the categories that fall outside of the realm of speculative cognition are compatible with a commitment to psychologism, then, I do not believe it can show that this commitment is compatible with all of them. I hasten to
